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THE METAMORPHOSIS OF COMPARABLE WORTH
Nancy E. Dowd*
The concept of comparable worth' has provoked an outpouring
of emotional rhetoric2 and scholarly analysis3 debating the concept's
* Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School.
1. Comparable worth has been succinctly defined as a "right to comparable pay for work
of comparable value." Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1731 (1986); see also infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. For
the seminal article on comparable worth, see Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 MICH. J. L. REF. 399 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Comparable Worth Is 'Loony Idea' Civil Rights Commission Chairman Says,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 223, at A-2 (Nov. 1984) (Clarence Pendleton says "Comparable
worth is the looniest idea since Looney Tunes."); White House Liason Linda Chavez Says
Comparable Worth Fervor Has Dimmed, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 236, at A-9 (Dec. 9,
1985) ("we have been able over the past few years to slow down what one person described
as a locomotive unable to be stopped, but we have not in fact derailed that locomotive.");
Title VII Called "Wave Of the Future" In Wage Discrimination Litigation, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 157, at A-8 (Aug. 12, 1983) (Dan Leach, former EEOC commissioner, says
comparable worth claims are "the wave of the future."); Comparable Worth's Pros & Cons
Debated at Civil Rights Constitution, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at A-i (June 12,
1984) (Winn Newman, general counsel to AFSCME argues comparable worth claims are "garden
variety" discrimination claims under Title VII); Norton, Pay Equity Is A Bad Idea, FORTUNE,
May 14, 1984, at 133 (comparable worth is "women's issue of Eighties"); Policy Statement
of National Council on Employment Policy, Comparable Worth and Equal Employment of
Women, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 181, at D-1, D-4 (Sept. 18, 1985) (push
toward pay equity is the logical next step in the ongoing efforts to define and promote equality
of opportunity).
Comparable worth has generated an odd alignment of supporters and critics. For example,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency entrusted with principal
responsibility for enforcement of federal employment discrimination laws, issued an opinion
in 1985 largely rejecting the concept of comparable worth as a viable legal doctrine. EEOC
Decision No. 85-8, 53 U.S.L.W. 2633 (June 25, 1985). Similarly, the Justice Department has
argued against the idea. Amicus Brief for the United States, American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois,
783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 161, at E-I (Aug.
20, 1985) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission issued a report rejecting
the concept, criticizing the concept of comparable worth as "fundamentally flawed." U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's (1984). On the other
hand, an editorial published in early 1985 in Business Week, a magazine which generally
speaks from the perspective of the business community, stated, "Comparable worth is an
extension of women's demand for equal pay for equal work, an idea that is both reasonable
and fair as a way of correcting historic wage discrimination against women." Editorial, Bus.
WEEK, Jan. 1985, at 140.
3. E.g., Becker, Comparable Worth in Antidiscrimination Legislation: A Reply to Freed
and Polsby, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 1112 (1984); Blumrosen, supra note 1; Freed & Polsby,
Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1078 (1984); Gasaway, Comparable
Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEo. L.J. 1123 (1981); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage
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viability and desirability. Rather than add to that debate, this article
will trace the evolution of the framework within which comparable
worth has developed as a legal doctrine, and identify the unresolved
issues and the strategic choices concerning those issues that may
determine the future scope of the concept of comparable worth. 4
Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
231 (1980); Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But Equal" - Job Segregation and Pay Equity
in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269; Weiler, supra note 1; Comment, Equal
Pay for Comparable Work, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1980); Comment, Equal Pay,
Comparable Work and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657 (1981). Two useful bibliographies
on the subject of comparable worth are BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, TiE COMPARABLE
WORTH ISSUE (1981) and TANIMOTO & INABA, WOMEN'S WORK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, COM-
PARABLE WORTH/PAY EQUITY, JOB EVALUATION ... AND ALL THAT (1985).
4. Although I do not intend to join the debate over whether comparable worth is legally
required or desirable as a matter of policy, it nevertheless seems only fair to state my position
in support of the concept of comparable worth. Briefly, my reasons are the following. Econ-
omists seem to agree that discrimination is in part the cause of the wage gap between the
sexes, that the labor market is not neutral or nondiscriminatory, and that employers do not
always act objectively or rationally in setting compensation. See infra note 24 and accompanying
text. If that is the case, such discrimination is actionable under existing discrimination theories.
Discrimination by individual employers in the form of setting compensation by deciding the
value of particular jobs and then discounting the rate paid to women or to jobs predominantly
held by women, can be reached under Title VII disparate treatment theory. Discrimination
in the form of payment of market wage rates which undervalue women's work is similarly
actionable under disparate impact theory if it can be demonstrated that the market rate
discriminates. In other words, comparable worth, in my view, clearly fits within the classic
disparate treatment/disparate impact theories of discrimination.
Precisely what defenses are applicable to comparable worth claims is less clear, but that
is a matter of further unraveling the relationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII,
see infra notes 33-36 and 101-105 and accompanying text. Also, from a remedial perspective,
it is not clear what standards the courts would apply for determining appropriate compensation
if both the individual employer's compensation structure and the market wage rate are de-
termined to be discriminatory.
Comparable worth is also desirable as a matter of policy, as it promises to resolve or be
the impetus for resolution of the wage gap. While vigorous enforcement of nondiscrimination
in hiring, promotion, and transfer may assist some women to enter and succeed in higher-
paying, traditionally male occupations, it provides no assistance to those women who cannot
change occupations, or who can find jobs only in traditionally female-dominated occupations.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text. For these women, comparable worth is necessary
to insure meaningful, real equality. E.g. E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN,
passim (1980); Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences Into Account, 54 FORDUAM
L. REV. 699, 719 (1986); Law, Re-thinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955 passim (1984). The only significant argument against this conclusion is that comparable
worth may have the counterproductive effect of keeping women in their (current) place.
Financially, however, this result would not occur: the effect of implementation of comparable
worth would be to increase salaries and insure that individuals in female-dominated occupations
were paid their actual worth. Furthermore, if the law of supply and demand really does work,
then higher pay in those occupations will attract men, thereby diminishing occupational seg-
regation and encouraging women to enter traditionally male occupations. Finally, the underlying
impetus for the concept of comparable worth is not that women dislike the work they do,
but rather that they are not paid the true value of the work they do because of their sex.
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The article is divided into three sections. First, it examines com-
parable worth litigation from its emergence in the 1970s through
1986.1 The article then focuses in detail on three recent opinions
and their impact on the current framework of comparable worth
litigation:6 the Ninth Circuit's opinion reversing the landmark Wash-
ington State7 case; the Seventh Circuit's opinion granting limited
reinstatement of the complaint in the American Nurses Association'
case; and the Supreme Court's opinion analyzing historic wage dis-
crimination in the Bazemore9 case. Finally, the article considers the
future of the concept of comparable worth in light of the unresolved
issues surrounding the scope of this legal doctrine and the impact
of litigation strategy on the resolution of those issues.'0
I. Tm CHANGING FRAMEWORK: AN OVERVIEW OF COMPARABLE
WORTH LITIGATION, 1970-1986
A. The Concept of Comparable Worth
The concept of comparable worth has as its factual predicate two
typical characteristics of women's employment: occupational con-
centration or segregation" and significantly lower wages compared
to those paid to men. 12 What continues to be most troubling about
this employment pattern is its stubborn persistence, despite the in-
creased presence of women in the workforce'3 and the existence for
5. See infra text accompanying notes 11-68.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 69-147.
7. American Fed. of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401
(9th Cir. 1985).
8. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
9. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 148-53.
11. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
13. The increased labor participation rate of women, among other factors, has heightened
interest and concern about occupational segregation and the wage gap. Women are entering
the workforce in record numbers: in 1980, 52% of women aged 16-64 worked, as compared
to 34076 in 1950. CONSUMER RESEARCH CENTER, TiE WORKING WOMAN: A PROGRESS REPORT
4-5 (1984) [hereinafter WORKING WOMAN]. The increase has been especially dramatic among
women aged 20-44, and among women with children. Id.; see also Waldman, Labor Force
Statistics from a Family Perspective, 106 MONTHLY LAB. RV., Dec. 1983, at 16, 17. It is
projected that two out of three entrants into the labor market over the next two decades
will be women. Women's Bur., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 298, Time of Change: 1983
Handbook on Women Workers 7, 17-22 (1983) [hereinafter Handbook on Women Workers]
see WORKING WOMAN, supra at 3-4. Women's increased participation in the workforce is
1986]
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over two decades of legislation prohibiting sex discrimination in em-
ployment. 14
Occupational concentration or segregation on the basis of sex is
pervasive and shows no signs of diminishment. According to the last
census, over half of all occupations are more than 80% male or
female dominated.,, Within the occupations in which most women
work, which are primarily in the clerical and service sectors, most
job classifications are female dominated.1 6
Equally persistent has been the wage gap between women and men.
Women on average earn only sixty-one cents for every dollar earned
by men. 17 This disparity is expected to continue well into the next
century.18 At least part of the wage gap has been attributed to the
lower earning capacity of the occupations where most women work.19
primarily motivated by the same considerations of economic need and economic betterment
that motivate men to work. Handbook on Women Workers, supra at 17. Increasingly, more
women than men must work simply to avoid slipping below the poverty line: one out of
every six households is headed by a woman, and one in every three of those households are
at the poverty level. Handbook on Woman Workers, supra at 15, 99-102. The closing of the
wage gap is therefore essential to avoid the increasing feminization of poverty.
14. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982).
15. Among the 503 occupations listed in the 1980 U.S. Census, 275 occupations were more
than 800o male- or female-dominated. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985, at 420, col. 1. It has
been estimated that in order for an equal proportion of men and women to be doing the
same work, two-thirds to three-quarters of all employees would have to change jobs. Blumrosen,
supra note 1, at 405.
Although there has been some breakdown of women's occupational concentration over the
past thirty years, the dominant trend has been the continuing trend of entry into female-
dominated occupations. Blumrosen, supra note 1, at 405. In addition, it has been projected
that this trend is likely to persist, given the expectation that the occupations in which women
are concentrated, particularly service occupations, are expected to expand in the next 20 years.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB
passim (1985).
16. Women are concentrated in clerical and service occupations: 42.50 of working women
work in sales, clerical or administrative occupations; and 25076 of working women work in
service occupations. Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 13, at 51-62, 87-96; see also
Mellar, Investigating the Differences in Weekly Earnings of Women and Men, 106 MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Dec. 1983, at 17-19. Eighty-one percent of all clerical occupations and 61076 of
service occupations are filled by women. Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 13, at
51-62. Thus, the majority of working women work in occupations that are 70-9507o female-
dominated. Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 13, at 51-62.
17. WORKING WoMAN, supra note 13, at 6-7; see also Shack-Marquez, Earnings Difference
Between Men and Women: An Introductory Note, 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1983, at
15.
18. J. SMITH & M. WARD, WOMEN'S WAGES AND WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
passim (1984).
19. E.g., M. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 6-7 (1983); E. DUNCAN, YEARS
OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY 153 (1984), Blumrosen, supra note 1, at 415-16.
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Advocates of comparable worth argue that there is a connection
between the wage gap and women's occupational concentration or
segregation: the gap is due in part to the depression of wages for
'"women's work.'' 20 "Women's work" is paid less not because it
has less value to employers, but rather because women, or predom-
inantly women, perform the work. 21 In other words, even though
work which women perform is of equal or greater value to an
employer than work performed predominantly by men, it is not paid
its full value because it is performed by women. 22 This undervaluation
is incorporated into employers' compensation schemes by various
means, including the use of discriminatory job evaluation analyses
to construct an employer's compensation structure. 23 Discriminatory
undervaluation of "women's work" is further magnified and per-
petuated by the incorporation of individual employers' wage dis-
crimination into the market wage rate. 24
20. Supra notes 3, 19.
21. Studies have shown that when a particular job changes from being predominantly male
to predominantly female, the wages decline and the job becomes more of a "dead end"
position. For example, the job of bank teller was traditionally held by men and was an entry
level position. After World War II, women were hired as bank tellers, and the job gradually
"turned" to one predominantly held by women. The job then changed to a dead end position,
and compensation for the position dropped from its previous relative level. Blumrosen, supra
note 1, at 408; see also TRErmAN & HARTMANN, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES 28-30, 38 (1981).
22. Historically, women were viewed as not "worth" as much as men because it was
assumed that their earnings were nonessential wages or merely "pin money," or that they
would leave the workforce as soon as they became married and assumed their proper roles
as wives and mothers. M. MEYER, WOMEN AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 2-4 (1978). To the contrary,
however, women have worked, historically and currently, to provide essential income and
maintenance for themselves and their families. J. BAUER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: JUDICIAL
RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION 21-22 (1978). According to 1980 census figures,
working wives' salaries constituted 270 of family income. Women who work full time con-
tributed an even larger percentage to family income (3807o), as did women in lower income
families (68%). Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 13, at 17. Furthermore, almost
160 of all families are maintained by a single female, over five times the number of families
maintained by single males. Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 13, at 15.
To assume that these attitudes have died with the enactment of legislation that prohibits
sex discrimination in employment is belied by the persistence of such attitudes and related
assumptions about women's role. See Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n,
106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986) (fundamentalist religious school advised pregnant teacher that according
to its religious beliefs, young mothers should stay home with pre-school age children; teacher
was discharged after complaining to state civil rights agency).
23. Blumrosen, supra note 1, at 428-41. The process of job evaluation has been at the
core of the comparable worth issue. E.g., R. HENDERSON, COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT (1976);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC
REVIEW (INTERIM REPORT TO THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION) (1979); Schwab,
Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND
ANSWERS; 549-77 (E. Livemash ed. 1984).
24. Blumrosen, supra note 1, at 441-57. At least on this point, Professor Blumrosen and
19861
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Translated into the primary legal theories recognized under em-
ployment discrimination law, the gist of a comparable worth claim
is that discrimination exists when workers in a job classification
dominated by one sex are paid less than workers in a classification
dominated by the opposite sex, where both job classifications are
of equal value or worth to the employer, or the underpaid classi-
fication is of greater value to the employer. 25 The concept includes
both intentional or disparate treatment discrimination,2 6 such as the
continuation of historic overtly discriminatory wage and hiring prac-
tices, as well as the discriminatory effects or disparate impact 2 7 of
facially neutral practices, such as the use of purportedly neutral job
evaluations or the market wage rate to establish compensation.
Although both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories
are theoretically applicable to a comparable worth claim, disparate
impact theory clearly constitutes the more radical and potentially far
reaching cause of action. By removing the issue of intent or motivation
and focusing on the effect of facially neutral employment practices,
disparate impact theory encourages the analysis of the structure and
impact of job assignment and compensation systems, and the ex-
her critics appears to be in agreement. See Nelson, Opton, Jr., & Wilson, Wage Discrimination
and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 233, 239-41,
247-48 (1980) (undervaluation reflection of wage discrimination).
25. This assumes, of course, that claims comparing dissimilar work by comparing the value
or worth of those jobs are cognizable under Title VII, an issue that has yet to be definitively
resolved. See infra note 41. According to the concept of comparable worth, the "worth" or
value of a job is generally defined by the skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions
of the job. These are factors utilized in the Equal Pay Act to determine the comparability
of particular jobs. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). The Act's factors were in turn derived from
factors long used in the business of job evaluation for the purpose of establishing compensation
systems. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. at 188, 199. The worth or value of a
particular job is measured according to these factors and computed on a point system. Id.
Once the evaluated worth of a female-dominated job classification is established, it may then
be compared to the benchmark of a male-dominated job classification of equal or lesser worth
in the particular employer's workforce. Blumrosen, supra note 1, at 428-41. The theory therefore
permits comparison of dissimilar jobs of equal value to the employer, as well as comparison
of dissimilar jobs of unequal value where one of the jobs is not being paid its evaluated
worth. Blumrosen, supra note 1, at 428-41.
26. Under disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must demonstrate, by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence, that the employer's conduct which resulted in adverse employment con-
sequences for the plaintiff was motivated by impermissible consideration of race, sex, national
origin, or religion. McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
27. Under disparate impact analysis, an employment policy that has a disproportionate
impact on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin which cannot be justified on
the grounds of business necessity constitutes prohibited discrimination. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
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amination of the unintended, but deliberate, incorporation of societal
discrimination into the employment structure.
Whether comparable worth will be incorporated within this broader
framework of discrimination analysis remains an open question. It
is clearly one of the critical issues that will determine the scope of
the legal doctrine of comparable worth. That it remains an unresolved
issue is indicative of the fact that comparable worth as a legal doctrine
is in a very early stage of development. 28 Comparable worth first
emerged as a legal issue in the 1970s, but it has only been since
1981, with the Supreme Court's decision in Gunther,29 that the door
has been open to the development of comparable worth as a legal
doctrine. 0 The evolution of the concept is critical to understanding
the current framework of comparable worth doctrine.
B. Phases of Comparable Worth Litigation
1. 1970-1981
When claims of comparable worth discrimination first were asserted
in the 1970s, the primary issue was whether any claim of comparable
worth discrimination, under any theory, was cognizable under Title
VII. 31 The focus was on the technical issue of whether discrimination
was actionable where the basis for comparison to determine the
existence of discrimination was not identical or nearly identical jobs,
the paradigm of an Equal Pay Act (EPA) case.32 This necessitated
28. This reflects a pattern not uncommon where the courts venture into the unknown in
the development of legal doctrine. As an area of law evolves, it is both boundary and trailblaze,
the limit of what is as well as the suggestion of what yet can be. Early in the development
of new doctrine, the stakes are particularly high - either a path of development may be
opened or it may be permanently blocked. Furthermore, even if an opening is given, there
is the effort to limit it to its terms, as opposed to viewing it as only a beginning of a broad
new development. Compare the development of the interpretation of the seniority section
under Title VII, as discussed in the scholarship cited in Note, Title VII v. Seniority: Ensuring
Rights or Denying Rights, 26 How. L.J. 1486 n.3 (1983).
29. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
30. See infra notes 31-43.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982). Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in the terms
and conditions of employment. The Bennett Amendment to Title VII, contained in section
703(h), provides that any defense to an Equal Pay Act claim will also serve as a defense to
a Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claim.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). The EPA requires equal pay for equal work by prohibiting
wage differentiation on the basis of sex where equal work is performed, unless such differ-
entiation is based on seniority, merit, quality or quantity of production, or any other factor
other than sex. Id. Equal work is defined as work of equal skill, effort, and responsibility
19861
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resolution of issues of statutory construction and legislative history
to determine the relationship between Title VII and the EPA before
questions of legal theory or the scope of comparable worth claims
could be addressed. 33
The courts during this period almost uniformly were hostile to
comparable worth claims.3 4 Some courts simply resolved the technical
statutory issue in favor of a narrow construction of the scope of
sex-based wage discrimination claims, holding that Congress intended
to limit such claims to the failure to provide equal pay for equal
work.35 Others indicated that even if Title VII was not so limited,
proof of a comparable worth claim would be difficult, if not im-
performed under similar working conditions. Id. Under the EPA, wage discrimination on the
basis of sex is actionable only if the work at issue is equal or substantially equal. Schultz
v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); see
also Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d 953, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1977); Ridgway v. United
Hospitals-Miller Div., 563 F.2d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent
Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
33. The issue to be resolved was whether the Bennett Amendment, see supra note 31, was
intended to limit Title VII wage discrimination claims to the restrictions imposed on Equal
Pay Act claims, most importantly that such claims involve equal work, or whether it was
only intended to permit employers to raise Equal Pay Act defenses in Title VII cases. County
of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 163, 167-68 (1981).
34. See Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir. 1980)
(rejecting comparable worth claim as beyond the scope of relief authorized by Title VII in
class action to enjoin city from adopting market-based compensation scheme that plaintiffs
contended perpetuated historic depression of wages on basis of sex); Christensen v. Iowa,
563 F.2d 353, 355-57 (8th Cir. 1977) (payment of market wages complete defense to comparable
worth claim, assuming one could be established); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166,
171 (5th Cir.) (reversing district court's finding in favor of plaintiff's comparable worth claim),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 121 (10th Cir. 1971)
(affirming district court's denial of relief); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505
F. Supp. 224, 284-85 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (courts cannot perform evaluations of job worth as
that is matter beyond judicial competence; therefore, in order to present comparable worth
claim, plaintiff must establish worth as part of prima facie case); Gerlach v. Michigan Bell,
501 F. Supp. 1300, 1320-21 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (comparable worth claims under Title VII
limited to Gunther model of disparate treatment claim).
Not surprisingly, most plaintiffs tried to fit their cases into an EPA equal work or substantially
equal work claim. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Radio and Machine Workers v.
Westinghouse, 631 F.2d 1094, 1097-98, 1107-08 (3d Cir. 1980) (employer violated Title VII
where explicit sex segregation of jobs and underpayment of women on basis of sex continued
after passage of Title VII, albeit in more subtle form), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981);
Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockage, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 950, 958 (10th Cir. 1980) (woman who
took over most but not all of duties of male advertising director was subjected to unlawful
discrimination when employer failed to award her wage increase to reflect additional re-
sponsibilities).
35. Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir. 1980); Gerlach
v. Michigan Bell, 501 F. Supp. 1300, 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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possible, and in any case an employer would have a complete defense
if it paid market wage rates.3 6
In 1981 the Supreme Court resolved the statutory construction issue
in County of Washington v. Gunther.3 7 In Gunther, the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant had deliberately failed to follow the results
of a wage evaluation study when it set compensation for its female
employees, although it had fully implemented the results of the study
for its male employees.3" The defendant contended that the claim
simply was not cognizable under Title VII because the female plaintiffs
performed work comparable to, but not sufficiently similar to, that
of the male classification to fall within the equal work standard of
the EPA, and Title VII went no further than the EPA.3 9 To the
contrary, however, the Court decided that Title VII was not limited
to the scope of the EPA, and held that the plaintiffs' claim stated
a valid cause of action under Title VII.4°
Gunther opened the door to judicial recognition of comparable
worth claims without resolving the question of the scope of the
comparable worth doctrine. 41 During the next phase of comparable
worth litigation, from 1981 until 1985, courts focused on discerning
what the Supreme Court really meant in Gunther: to limit wage
discrimination claims to the Gunther model, or to invite further
development of wage discrimination claims, including the comparable
worth theory.4 2 The legal issues left unresolved by Gunther included
36. Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356-57 (8th Cir. 1977); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l
Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 284 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
37. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
38. Id. at 180-81. The defendant had evaluated the value of its job classifications as a
prelude to determining wages. Id. The female guard classification was evaluated as worth
95% of the male guard classification. Id. at 180. The male guard classification was paid
100% of its evaluated worth; the female classification was paid only 70% of the wage rate
for the male classification. Id. at 180-81.
39. Id. at 164-65, 177-78. Furthermore, at the time suit was filed, the plaintiffs could not
bring a cause of action under the Equal Pay Act because the EPA was not yet applicable
to municipal employees. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 164, n.3.
40. Id. at 181.
41. In its usual inscrutable fashion, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether
such a claim would constitute discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 166 & n.6.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45. The Gunther decision generated considerable
scholarly debate. See, e.g., Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based Wage Discrimi-
nation, 69 IOWA L. REv. 655, 656 (1984) (discussing uncertainty about holding in Gunther);
Cox, Equal Work, Comparable Worth and Disparate Treatment: An Argument for Narrowly
Construing County of Washington v. Gunther, 22 DUQ. L. Rav. 65, 68 (1983) (Gunther should
be narrowly construed); Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But Equal'"-Job Segregation and
Pay Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. Rav. 269, 282-83 (Gunther breaks new
legal ground, opening door to wide variety of discrimination suits).
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whether wage discrimination claims were limited to those involving
comparable work or could include claims of comparable worth, and
whether the disparate treatment theory that was the basis of the
plaintiffs' claim in Gunther was coincidental or essential. If wage
discrimination claims could be established under disparate impact
theory, as well as disparate treatment theory, that would obviate the
necessity of proof of intentional discrimination.43 Finally, the Gunther
decision left unclear what defenses could be raised against a wage
discrimination claim that falls outside the parameters of the Equal
Pay Act.
2. 1981-85
What is noteworthy about the post-Gunther period is its similarity
to the pre-Gunther era: the courts continued to be hostile toward
the concept of comparable worth, and almost uniformly took the
position that Gunther represented the outer limit of wage discrim-
ination claims under Title VII.4 Wage discrimination was cognizable,
therefore, only if it involved the comparison of comparable work
and alleged intentional discrimination under disparate treatment
theory.45
The courts' rejection of a broader view of the concept of com-
parable worth was largely grounded in institutional and evidentiary
concerns, rather than theoretical or analytical objections. First, the
courts questioned the propriety of judicial interference with the labor
market and employers' compensation systems.4 Courts viewed com-
parable worth as sanctioning a potentially radical intrusion into the
economy, an area in which the courts were reluctant to venture absent
clear direction from Congress to do so.
Second, the courts questioned their ability to make the determi-
nations essential to a finding of discrimination under the concept
43. See supra note 27.
44. See, e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 706-07 (9th Cir. 1984)
(wage disparity claims go no further than Gunther model); Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713
F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir. 1983) (Gunther sets limits upon sex-based wage discrimination
claims); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 405-07 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
plaintiff's claim limited to Gunther model), vacated & remanded, 103 S. Ct. 34 (1982), aff'd
on remand, 695 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1983).
45. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 726-27 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (court
precluded from evaluating different jobs to determine their worth); Waterman v. New York
Tel. Co., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Congress did not intend
to put courts in business of evaluating jobs (citing Hodgson v. Corning Glass, 474 F.2d 226,
231 (2d Cir. 1973))).
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of comparable worth. The courts balked at the idea that they would
be asked to determine the value or worth of particular jobs, a task
which they viewed as beyond the ken of judges and inherently suspect
due to the unavoidable subjectivity of the process. 47 Even if the
parties agreed to or admitted the valuation of jobs, the courts were
clearly skeptical of their ability to evaluate such evidence.
Third, even if the problem of determining the worth of jobs could
be resolved, as, for example, if the parties stipulated to the results
of an evaluation or if an employer had adopted the results of an
evaluation, the courts viewed the payment of different wages to jobs
of equal worth to be entirely justified if the wage rate was based
on the market rate. 48 Courts viewed use of the market rate as an
unquestionably objective and nondiscriminatory practice merely re-
flective of the law of supply and demand. Payment of market wage
rates consequently afforded employers a complete defense to claims
of comparable worth.
The courts' critique of the concept of comparable worth during
this period pointed to serious evidentiary issues that plaintiffs would
have to overcome in order to present a convincing case of wage
discrimination. On the other hand, the critique was often less than
fair as virtually all of the cases decided during this period had initially
been filed and often had been tried prior to the Gunther decision
and, therefore, had proceeded on a more limited theory of wage
discrimination .49
In December of 1983, however, a decision was rendered in the
first post-Gunther case in which a fully developed claim of comparable
worth was presented, the massive Washington State case. 0 In that
47. See, e.g., Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1983) (court refuses
to engage in subjective assessment of different jobs); Penk v. Oregon Bd. of Higher Educ.,
No. 80-436, slip. op. at ._ (D. Ore. Feb. 15, 1985) (subjective evaluations of faculty members
is permissible and necessary and courts should be deferential to those subjective decisions).
EEOC v. Affiliated Foods, Inc., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 943, 959 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(proof of comparable worth of particular jobs must allow court to conclude with confidence
that jobs are equally valuable).
48. See, e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 706-07 (9th Cir. 1984)
(wages based on market rate not affected by Title VII); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe,
585 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (impractical and violative of market conditions
to try to address all wage disparities under Title VII); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F.
Supp. 435, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (employer not liable under Title VII for following existing
market rates).
49. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir. 1984) (Schroeder, J.,
concurring).
50. American Fed. of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 578 F. Supp.
846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
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case, a comparable worth claim was made on behalf of 15,000 state
employees in female-dominated 5 job classifications who, according
to several studies commissioned by the state, were paid an average
of 20% less than employees in male-dominated classifications of
comparable worth.12 In 1983, the federal district court issued an
opinion finding that the state had violated Title VII under both
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories and ordered im-
mediate relief that would cost the state an estimated $1 billion. 3
The district court's decision in Washington State avoided the issue
of determining the value or worth of particular job classifications
by finding that the state had accepted the valuations in the studies
that the state had commissioned.14 The court read the Gunther decision
as permitting the use of both disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories in presenting wage discrimination claims.5 5 The court found
proof of disparate treatment, and evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation, particularly in the state's failure to remedy pay disparities
once they were revealed by the job evaluation process.5 6 The court
based its alternative finding of disparate impact discrimination on
the finding that the state's compensation system had a disparate
impact upon employees in predominantly female job classifications.5 7
There was no real discussion of whether the state had merely paid
51. "Female-dominated" was defined as. employees in positions occupied 70076 or more
by females. Id. at 851.
52. 770 F.2d at 1403. The state had conducted three studies of its compensation system,
in 1974, 1976 and 1980. Id. The studies evaluated jobs on the basis of skill, effort, responsibility,
and working conditions, and found that female dominated jobs on average were compensated
20% less than male-dominated jobs of comparable value. Id. In December, 1976, Governor
Evans included a $7 million appropriation in the budget for pay adjustments in light of these
studies. 578 F. Supp. at 862. In 1977, however, the new governor, Dixie Lee Ray, deleted
this appropriation, although there was a sufficient budget surplus that would have covered
the appropriation. Id. After suit was filed, the legislature, in 1983, appropriated $1.5 million
for pay equity adjustments effective in 1984. Id. at 862-67. When the suit was finally settled,
under the terms of the settlement the legislature appropriated $41.4 million for fiscal year
1986, with successive $10 million annual increases, for a total cost of $482.4 million. See
infra note 63.
53. 578 F. Supp. 846, 864-65. The high cost of the judgment was due to the combination
of immediate backpay awards, estimated at $300 million, immediate pay raises, estimated at
$75 million, plus the continued cost of those pay raises. Court Order Pay Raises and Back
Pay For Female State Employees In Washington, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 242, at AA-
1, AA-3 (Dec. 15, 1983).
54. 578 F. Supp. at 862.
55. Id. at 855-56, 864-65.
56. Id. at 864-65.
57. Id. at 864.
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market rates, and if so, whether that practice could nevertheless be
discriminatory. 58
Reaction to the district court's decision was swift and intense.
Advocates of comparable worth hailed the opinion and used it as
a potent weapon to threaten or settle lawsuits, 9 to negotiate pay
equity in collective bargaining, 6° and to lobby for legislation to achieve
58. Id.
59. For cases filed or settled after the opinion, see California State Employees Assoc. v.
California, No. C-84-7275-MHP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 1985) (LExIs, Genfed Library, Dist.
file) (suit filed on behalf of 37,000 current state employees, with a potential class of 100,000
past and future employees, focusing on 400 job classifications, 170 of which are totally female,
the balance of which are two-thirds or more female-dominated; suit alleges that the state
Department of Personnel acknowledges the existence of pay inequities, despite 1981 amendment
of state civil service law to require salaries for female dominated jobs to be set on the basis
of comparability of the value of the work performed); AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 609
F. Supp. 695, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (suit filed on behalf of 10,000 employees in 200 job
classifications); St. Louis Newspaper Guild Local 47 v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 618 F. Supp.
1468 1469 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (suit filed seeking wage adjustments in inside sales jobs held
predominantly by women, comparing those jobs to outside sales jobs held predominantly by
men); Hawaii Gov't Employees Assoc. v. Hawaii, No. 84-1314 (D. Hawaii Aug. 12, 1985)
(LExts, Genfed Library, Dist. File) (alleging wage discrimination against employees of state,
its local subdivisions, colleges and universities, and support staff of state judiciary); Michigan
State Employee's Assoc. v. EEOC and Michigan Dept. of Civil Rights, No. 84-CV-4058DT
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 1984) (LExis, Genfed Library, Dist. File) (suit filed September 1984
on behalf of 15,000 employees requesting the court to order the state and federal agencies
to investigate charges of sex discrimination in the state's compensation system based on charges
filed with the agencies in August 1981).
Administrative charges were filed as a prelude to litigation in several cases. See Pennsylvania
Nurses, File EEOC Charges Alleging Sex Based Wage Discrimination, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 115, at A-I1-A-12 (June 14, 1985) (charge filed June 1985 on behalf of nurses and other
female state employees alleging 84076 of state classifications are 70076 or more dominated by
one sex, and 5007o of all job classifications have no women in the classification).
60. The use of the Washington State case as a lever in collective bargaining was apparent
in a number of settlements. In 1985, the city of Los Angeles signed an agreement to implement
a $12 million pay equity adjustment for 3900 city employees, to be phased in over a three
year period, in exchange for settlement of a federal suit filed against the city. Los Angeles
and AFSCME Settle on Three- Year Pay Equity Pact, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at A-
2-A-3 (May 10, 1985). This agreement translated into a 10 to 15076 salary increase for designated
female-dominated job classifications. Id. After a ten week strike, Yale University agreed to
a three year contract covering 2700 clerical and technical employees which provided across
the board increases of 20-25% and established a new step progression. Yale University's White
Collar Workers Overwhelmingly Ratify Contract Terms, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at
A-7, A-8-A-9 (Jan. 24, 1985). Under the agreement, signed in January, 1985, two thirds of
unit employees would move up in the new progression, resulting in a 3576 increase for some
employees over the term of the contract. Id. New York State agreed to perform a pay equity
study, and the study indicated that 77,000 women and minorities in the state were underpaid.
Pay Equity Studies Find 77,000 N. Y. Women, Minorities Underpaid, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 224, at A-3 (Nov. 20, 1985). The state has committed $74 million over the next 2 years
to implement the recommendations of the study: $64 million to be negotiated in the 1985-
88 contracts with the three state employees' unions and $10 million for adjustments for
management and confidential employees. Id.
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comparable worth. 61 Critics vehemently attacked the opinion, and
while an appeal of the decision was pending before the Ninth Circuit,
the United States Civil Rights Commission, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and the Justice Department all formally
took positions against recognizing a broad concept of comparable
worth.62 In September, 1985, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion
reversing the district court opinion, essentially finding Gunther to
represent the limit of wage discrimination claims under Title VII and
rejecting the finding of discrimination under either disparate impact
or disparate treatment theories. 63
61. A survey by the Council of State Governments in January, 1985, indicated that most
state governments were expected to consider comparable worth legislation in the next two to
three years. Most States Will Consider Bills on Comparable Worth In Next Three Years,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 8, at A-9 (Jan. 11, 1985). Between 1983 and 1985, four states
enacted legislation to upgrade predominantly female jobs according to their comparable value:
Minnesota, New Mexico, Iowa, and Washington. Id.; see Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable
Worth Under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMTARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DIscium-
NATION, 238 (H. Remick ed. 1984).
Most other states have sponsored studies concerning the concept of comparable worth and
their compensation systems, or are monitoring developments in other states. BNA Publishes
Report on Pay Equity, 22 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1076, at 1619 (Aug. 20, 1984).
Not surprisingly, considering the views of the Reagan administration, no federal legislation
has been enacted. See supra note 2.
62. See supra note 2. According to the Civil Rights Commission, the valuation of jobs
is inherently subjective, and therefore there is no meaningful way to measure the worth of
particular jobs. Findings and Recommendations of U.S. Civil Rights Commission Report on
Comparable Worth, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at E-1 (Apr. 12, 1985)
(adopted April 11, 1985). The Commission also concluded the wage gap is largely due to
factors other than discrimination. Id. The General Accounting Office reviewed the Commission's
report in June, 1985 and criticized it as flawed and containing numerous inconsistencies and
errors. GAO Faults Civil Rights Commission Study Rejecting Comparable Worth, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at A-12 (June 24, 1985).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rejected the "pure" comparable worth
theory, defined as indicating the existence of discrimination by establishing the predominance
of one sex in a job classification and unequal pay in comparison to a job classification
dominated by men of equal value. EEOC Decision No. 858, 53 U.S.L.W. 2633, 2633 (June
25, 1985). If, however, an employer admits that jobs are of equal value as a result of the
adoption of the results of a job evaluation study and refuses to pay the evaluated value,
then a cognizable claim exists under Title VII. Id. At the time the EEOC issued its decision,
approximately 250 comparable worth claims were pending at the Commission, most involving
public sector employers. Report by House Committee on Government Operations On EEOC's
Handling of Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 102,
at D-1, D-3 (May 25, 1984).
In August, 1985, the Justice Department filed an amicus brief in the Seventh Circuit arguing
against recognition of the concept of comparable worth in American Nurses' Assoc. v. Illinois,
783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986), urging affirmance of the district court's dismissal of that case
on the ground that Title VII does not encompass the theory of comparable worth. Amicus
Brief, supra note 2, at E-1, E-3.
63. American Fed'n. of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401,
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The Ninth Circuit's opinion initiated a new phase in comparable
worth litigation. As the first opinion from a federal appellate court
on the theory of comparable worth in a case where the theory was
fully litigated, it had enormous impact. Although the opinion had
little effect on the number of cases being filed, it significantly in-
fluenced the theory of those cases. 64 This trend was reinforced by
American Nurses' Association v. Illinois65 (ANA), a Seventh Circuit
decision issued in February, 1986, which similarly limited comparable
worth claims to disparate impact theory. 66 The net effect of the
Washington State and ANA opinions was to confine the development
of comparable worth to an extremely conservative, limited framework.
On the other hand, in June, 1986, the Supreme Court issued an
opinion in a race-based wage discrimination case, Bazemore v. Friday,67
which took a far more liberal view of the evidence and theory of
proof of wage discrimination, suggesting a counterbalance to the
Washington State/ANA model.6 These three cases are clearly the
current guideposts in comparable worth litigation and merit close
analysis to define the evolving framework of comparable worth doc-
trine.
II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF COMPARABLE WORTH:
Washington State, ANA, and Bazemore
A. Washington State
The Ninth Circuit's Washington State decision rejected the lower
court's judgment of discrimination under both disparate treatment
1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the plaintiffs initially petitioned for rehearing en banc
and vowed to appeal the case to the Supreme Court, the parties agreed to settle the case,
and the settlement was subsequently approved by the state legislature on January 31, 1986.
Washington State Pay Equity Settlement Ratified By Legislature, Court Review Next, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at A-3 (Feb. 6, 1986). The terms of the settlement provided for:
(1) pay raises to be given over a seven year period to 35,000 employees in female-dominated
job classifications; (2) $41.4 million to be available for pay adjustments on April 1, 1986
(the 1985 legislature appropriated $41.4 million for settlement of the case or implementation
of its 1983 pay equity law), followed by $10 million annually through June 30, 1992, which
adds up to a total cost of $482.4 million; and (3) no concession by AFSCME that the Ninth
Circuit decision is correct, and no admission by the state that it discriminated in any respect.
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at A-9 to A-10 (Jan. 3, 1986).
64. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
65. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
66. Id. at 721.
67. 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
68. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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and disparate impact theories. 69 The court's reversal of the disparate
treatment claim was based upon the purported failure of the plaintiffs
to prove intent to discriminate, a necessary element to establish a
right to relief under that theory of discrimination. 70 According to
the court, the state's failure to correct the inequities uncovered by
the state-initiated studies of its compensation system did not raise
the inference of intent to discriminate on the basis of sex. 7 ' To the
contrary, the court found that the state retained the discretion to
act or not to act in response to the findings of the job evaluation
studies. 72 To conclude otherwise, the court reasoned, would discourage
the very analysis necessary for the correction of pay inequities. 73
The court also found that there could be no finding of discrim-
ination when the employer had merely paid market wage rates. 74 The
court suggested that even if the employer had knowledge that the
market was discriminatory, the employer was still entitled to utilize
market wage rates without fear of legal liability for discrimination. 75
Title VII was not designed to interfere with the law of supply and
demand, according to the court, and employers cannot be required
to pay wages on the basis of the job's value irrespective of external
market wage rates. 76
In contrast to its rejection of the disparate treatment claim on
the basis of insufficient proof of discriminatory intent, the court
reversed the disparate impact finding on the ground that this theory
of discrimination simply could not encompass the concept of com-
parable worth. 77 According to the court, disparate impact theory is
69. American Fed'n. of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d at
1405-08.
70. Id. at 1406; see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981) (plaintiff bears ultimate burden of proving defendant intentionally discriminated);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (complainant bears burden.of
establishing four part prima facie case of discrimination).
71. American Fed'n. of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d at
1408.
72. Id. at 1407.
73. Id. at 1408.
74. Id. at 1406-07.
75. Id. at 1406. The court noted that "the state did not create the market disparity"
Id.
76. Id. at 1407. The court stated: "We find nothing in the language of Title VII or its
legislative history to indicate Congress intended to abrogate fundamental principles such as
the laws of supply and demand or to prevent employers from competing in the labor market."
Id.
77. Id. at 1405-06. The court noted, "The instant case does not involve an employment
practice that yields to disparate impact analysis." Id. at 1406.
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limited to analyzing specific, clearly delineated employer practices
as they affect a single point in the employment relationship, usually
the employee selection process . 7  Disparate impact analysis is, there-
fore, inapplicable to the complexities of an employer's compensation
system. 79
The net result of the court's opinion is to limit claims of comparable
worth to the Gunther framework of disparate treatment analysis.
Furthermore, the opinion requires that the plaintiff establish the
employer's specific intent to discriminate in order to establish a
disparate treatment claim.8 0 It would not be sufficient, for example,
for the plaintiff to eliminate all other justifiable reasons for adopting
or maintaining a particular compensation system, leaving the inference
of sex discrimination as the sole remaining motivation. Rather, the
court's opinion seems to require that a plaintiff present proof that
the compensation system was adopted or maintained because it would
discriminate against women, not merely in spite of that effect. This
raises the plaintiff's burden of proof of discriminatory intent in a
disparate treatment case to a constitutional level of proof,8" a standard
which has never been imposed on Title VII plaintiffs. 2 This standard
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1406.
80. Or, as the court puts it, there must be proof of culpability. Id. at 1407. In other
words, one can use a discriminatory practice as long as there is no motive to discriminate.
This is contrary to the tort concept of intent, which presumes that one intends the consequences
of one's voluntary acts, see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971), and is closer
to the criminal law concept of intent or mens rea, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW 195-208 (1972). See generally Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in
Defining Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C.L. REV. 943, 975-
85 (1984) (discussing proof of culpability).
81. The Supreme Court outlined what is required in order to establish the requisite element
of discriminatory intent in sex discrimination cases brought under the equal protection clause
in Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). The Court stated that "[d]iscriminatory
purpose .... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences."
Id. (citation omitted). According to the Court, "It implies that the decisionmaker, in this
case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at
279 (footnotes omitted). For two critiques of the Supreme Court's standard, see Blumberg,
De Facto and De Jure Sex Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause: A Reconsideration
of the Veterans' Preference in Public Employment, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1976); Weinzweig,
Discriminatory Impact and Intent Under the Equal Protection Clause: The Supreme Court
and the Mind-Body Problem, I J. OF L. & INEQUALITY 277 (1983).
82. In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court stated: "We have never held that the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical
to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today .... [Olur cases
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether
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would make proof of discriminatory intent all but impossible except
in rare cases. 3
The court's opinion in Washington State also eliminates the use
of the disparate impact theory for proving comparable worth claims
as a matter of law. The court's rejection of disparate impact theory
is based upon its application of a complexity limitation that has no
basis in doctrine or precedent. To the contrary, the theory has been
applied in quite complicated selection, promotion, and transfer cases.8 4
Moreover, there is no indication in any of the Supreme Court's
pronouncements on the theory of disparate impact or in Congress'
express approval of the doctrine that any such limitation exists.85
This unsatisfactory rationale for refusing to apply disparate impact
it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact. ... Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976). Although
the constitutional and statutory standards are quite similar, they arguably differ, principally
because the statutory standard recognizes the difficulty of proving intent and supports inferring
intent from circumstantial evidence. As the Court has noted: "[tihere will seldom be 'eyewitness'
testimony as to the employer's mental processes [in discrimination cases]." United States Bd.
of Gov. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (under disparate treatment theory "[p]roof of discrim-
inatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of differences in treatment"). See generally Brodin, supra note 80, at 979 n.164, 983 n.183.
83. See Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Ore. 1970) (direct
evidence of discriminatory intent is rare, therefore, intent most often proved by circumstantial
evidence), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974). As the Supreme Court stated in Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981): "[tlhe prima facie case serves an
important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons
for the plaintiff's rejection." Id. at 253-54. As the Court had previously explained in Furnco
Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, (1978), the prima facie case "raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Id. at 577.
84. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3227 (1983)
(disparate impact theory available in case involving selection of officers to be laid off);
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982) (disparate impact theory applied in case involving
promotion); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-68 (1977)
(disparate impact on minority employees addressed in transfer case).
85. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Congress indicated its approval of the Griggs
standard when amending Title VII in 1972. H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2144.
The court's attempt to limit the disparate impact theory is not unique. Pouncy v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982). In addition to the attempt to limit the doctrine
to single, discrete employment criteria, some courts have limited disparate impact theory to
neutral criteria, as opposed to subjective criteria. E.g., Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment
Serv., 699 F.2d 760, 765 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983); Harris v. Ford Motor
Co., 651 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1981) contra Regner v. City of Chicago, 789 F.2d. 534 (7th
Cir. 1986); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d
1037, 1043 (10th Cir. 1981).
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theory to comparable worth claims leaves the distinct impression that
the court's conclusion actually was premised upon institutional and
economic concerns. The utilization of disparate impact theory to
litigate comparable worth claims would permit what the court views
as unacceptable and costly judicial intrusion into the labor market.
By limiting comparable worth to disparate treatment analysis, the
court limits liability to instances where the discriminator can be
identified and the motive to discriminate can be established, rather
than imposing liability for the choice, for whatever reasons, of neutral
means that discriminate . 6
The Washington State opinion is also significant for the issues
that it does not discuss. The questions of how the worth or value
of a job can be proved, the role of the fact finder, and analysis
of job evaluation studies, issues which have consistently troubled the
courts with respect to comparable worth claims,8 7 are not examined
in detail in the opinion. Although the court would permit evaluation
studies to be offered as relevant evidence, it is clear that it views
such evidence as having limited value.8
The court also provides no extended analysis of the operation of
labor market wage rates.8 9 The court appears to accept the concept
that either the market is non-discriminatory, 90 or that if it is dis-
86. This parallels the Reagan administration's attempts in the affirmative action area to
limit remedies for discrimination to victim-specific relief after the decision in Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). See Remarks of Assistant Attorney General
Reynolds on Memphis Case reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 116, at E-1 (June 15,
1984) (Stotts limits Title VII remedies to make whole relief only for actual victims of dis-
crimination). This interpretation has been resoundingly rejected by the Supreme Court. Johnson
v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 55 U.S.L.W. 4379, 4383 n.8 (1987); Local 28 of
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n. v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3049 (1986); Local No. 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3072 (1986).
87. See supra notes 36, 46 and accompanying text.
88. 770 F.2d 1401, 1406, 1408 American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v.
Washington, (9th Cir. 1986). According to the court, the value of a job is only one factor
in determining compensation, therefore, even if value were proved, it would not be sufficient
to show comparable value. Id. at 1407. In other words, it only constitutes a subtotal of what
a job is worth, not the bottom line. Furthermore, the court indicated that comparable worth
may not be a feasible approach to employee compensation. Id. at 1408.
89. Even the critics of comparable worth seem to agree that there is discrimination in the
market. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. In other words, employers do not appear
to act solely as economic animals, and to assume that they do so in order to provide them
with a defense to a discrimination claim, while admitting that the market is not nondiscri-
minatory, is a legalistic Catch 22.
90. American Fed'n for State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d at
1407 ("Neither law nor logic deems the free market system a suspect enterprise").
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criminatory, an employer nevertheless may pay market rates. 9 1 It is
unclear whether a plaintiff could ever establish a case of discrimination
if the defendant employer simply paid market rates, by showing, for
example, that the market is discriminatory and that the employer
had specific intent to discriminate, or whether payment of market
wage rates is per se a nondiscriminatory practice. If the court's
position is the latter, it appears to conflict with decisions under the
Equal Pay Act holding that the existence of discriminatory practices
in the labor market is not a justification for an individual employer
to discriminate by adopting those practices. 92
B. American Nurses' Association
The narrow framework imposed on the concept of comparable
worth by the Washington State opinion was reinforced by the opinion
rendered six months later by the Seventh Circuit in the American
Nurses' Association (ANA) case. 93 Although reversing the district
court's outright dismissal of the plaintiffs' comparable worth claims,
the opinion reinstated the case only to the extent of a Gunther-type
disparate treatment claim. 94 Paralleling the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit, the court noted that in order to prove their case, the plaintiffs
would have to show that the compensation system was adopted or
maintained because it would discriminate on the basis of sex, not
merely in spite of its discriminatory effect. 9 In other words, the
plaintiffs would have to show specific intent to discriminate: it would
not suffice to show that the state failed to act in response to an
evaluation study which demonstrated sex-based wage disparities, or
that the state paid market wage rates, despite the knowledge that
this would have a disparate impact on the basis of sex.9
Although the court was not required to decide whether disparate
treatment was the sole legal theory available to the plaintiffs, it
nevertheless strongly suggested, in dicta, that the limitation of com-
91. See id. at 1406 (state not responsible for creating market rates).
92. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974) (company practice
of taking advantage of job market where women are paid less is illegal under Equal Pay
Act).
93. American Nurses' Ass'n. v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); see also EEOC v.
Madison Community Unit School Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 727.
95. Id. at 720-22 ("[there must be] evidence that the ... [defendant] decided not to raise
the wages of particular workers because most of those workers were female") (emphasis in
original).
96. Id.
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parable worth claims to disparate treatment analysis may be required
by the Gunther decision or by constitutional equal protection doctrine.9 7
The court pointed out that the Gunther decision implies that the
interrelationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII permits
Equal Pay Act defenses to be raised in all wage discrimination cases
brought under Title VII, not just those that would mirror a cause
of action under the Equal Pay Act.9 8 If this is true, then one of
the Equal Pay Act defenses available to an employer is to pay wage
differentials based upon a factor other than sex even if this results
in a disparate impact on the basis of sex.9 This defense would
eliminate disparate impact wage discrimination claims, the court rea-
soned, and confine Title VII wage discrimination claims to cases of
intentional discrimination, or, in other words, disparate treatment
theory. 100
Although this reasoning would neatly encapsulate comparable worth
within the Gunther framework, there are two flaws in the court's
analysis. First, as the court itself concedes, the Supreme Court in
Gunther simply did not decide, nor did the Court discuss in dicta,
whether EPA defenses could be raised in all Title VII wage dis-
crimination claims.10' Certainly there is ample basis to argue that
EPA defenses should be limited to EPA claims, whether brought
directly under the EPA or under Title VII. 10 2 Second, the opinion
seems to assume sub silento that payment of market wage rates would
always be a defense under the Equal Pay Act-a conclusion which
directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's position that payment
of a discriminatory market wage rate is not a "factor other than
sex" that constitutes a defense under the Equal Pay Act.103
97. Id. at 720-21. The plaintiffs, perhaps in reaction to the Washington State decision,
argued on appeal that their complaint solely alleged disparate treatment theory. Id.
98. Id. at 723.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l)(iv) (1976).
100. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d at 723.
101. Id.
102. Concededly, the Court uses broad language in Gunther that could be construed to
permit EPA defenses to be raised in all Title VII wage discrimination claims. County of
Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 175, (1981). As the Court pointed out in Gunther, however,
the Bennett Amendment was intended to be a technical amendment to prevent an employer
from being held liable under Title VII for those practices permitted by the Equal Pay Act.
Id. at 174-75. What is authorized or permitted under the EPA, however, exists only in relation
to the equal work factual setting that is the concern of the EPA. Id. at 168-69. It is reasonable,
therefore, to apply EPA defenses only to equal work claims (as defined under the EPA),
but otherwise subject other types of wage discrimination claims to Title VII defenses.
103. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974). As the Court noted:
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In the alternative, the court asserts that the equal protection clause
may require disparate treatment analysis and, therefore, proof of
intentional discrimination. 10 4 The court's rationale for this argument
is grounded on its analysis of the perceived interrelation between
constitutional and statutory discrimination analysis. The equal pro-
tection clause is not violated when a law or practice simply has a
differential impact; there must be proof of intentional discrimina-
tion. 105 Therefore, if all that is alleged in this case is that the state
utilized a compensation scheme which disproportionately and ad-
versely impacted on women, that does not satisfy the constitutional
requirement of discriminatory intent. 10 6
The ANA court points out that this requirement of discriminatory
intent is also an essential element of Title VII disparate treatment
theory,'0 7 that is, the statutory and constitutional intent standards
are the same. The court notes that the statutory standard is different
only if disparate impact theory applies to the claim. 08 The court
then states that in the "usual" disparate impact case, the plaintiff
challenges an exclusionary practice, and "[ilt is not apparent what
the analogy to an exclusionary job qualification would be in this
case." 9 It is from this line of reasoning that the court apparently
reaches the conclusion that its rejection of the disparate impact theory
may be constitutionally compelled.
Unexplained by the ANA court is its leap from the description
of the "usual" disparate impact claim to the conclusion that the
limitation of comparable worth claims to disparate treatment theory
is constitutionally compelled. The unspoken step in the court's analysis
appears to be that because a comparable worth claim does not re-
semble the "usual" impact case, it cannot be proved under that
theory; such a claim can only be proved under disparate treatment
The differential [in wages) arose simply because men would not work at the low rate
paid women inspectors, and it reflected a job market in which Corning could pay
women less than men for the same work. That the company took advantage of such
a situation may be understandable as a matter of economics, but its differential never-
theless became illegal once Congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for
equal work.
Id.
104. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722-23.
105. Id. at 722.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 723.
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theory, and under that theory discriminatory intent must be estab-
lished, which is equivalent to the constitutional standard of intent.
If this is the court's implicit reasoning, the conclusion that the legal
theory applicable to comparable worth claims is constitutionally com-
pelled hangs on a slender thread: the court's description of disparate
impact cases must be transformed into a prescribed limitation on
the use of disparate impact theory. Otherwise, the court's conclusion
flies in the face of the rule that what is constitutionally permitted
is not a limitation on what may be prohibited by Title VII." 0
By making the argument that disparate treatment is the only legal
theory that could be used to prove a comparable worth claim, the
court attempts to avoid the question of whether the concept of
comparable worth could analytically fit within disparate impact the-
ory. The court makes it clear, however, that it strongly disapproves
of the inclusion of comparable worth claims within disparate impact
theory. According to the court, the complexity of compensation
systems and, more importantly, the disruption of the labor market
if this theory were adopted, militates against the use of this legal
theory."' In other words, the court opposes the use of disparate
impact theory because of its results. The depth of the court's hostility
to the concept of comparable worth is suggested by its belittling
characterization of the plaintiffs' claim as "intentional discrimination
that consists of overpaying workers in predominantly male jobs be-
cause most of those workers are male." '" 12
110. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 383 n.8, 391
(1982) (district court erred in equating Title VII with § 1981 which incorporates constitutional
standard of proof of discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976)
(differentiating Title VII and constitutional standards of discrimination).
111. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719-20. This is particularly intriguing
because the author of the opinion, Judge Posner, is known for his advocacy of the use of
economic theory and analysis in resolving legal issues. E.g., R. POSNER, ECONOmiC ANALYSIS
OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); R. POSNER, THE EcoNomics OF JUSTICE (1981); Posner, Free Speech
in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1 (1986). Judge Posner's opinion for the
court is even more disappointing because rather than dealing with this issue by citation to
academic authority, it proclaims certain conclusions as presumed. American Nurses' Ass'n v.
Illinois, 783 F.2d at 719-20.
112. Id. at 730. This blatent mischaracterization of the plaintiffs' claims and the essential
nature of the concept of comparable worth is either a classic Freudian slip or suggests a
subconscious fear that predominantly male judges are next in line for salary reduction at the
hands of the proponents of comparable worth. The tone of the opinion throughout is that
the position of advocates of comparable worth is simply too incredible to be given credence.
For example:
An employer ... that simply pays the going wage ... and makes no effort to discourage
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In sum, ANA, like Washington State, limits comparable worth to
the Gunther paradigm, with the exception that the decisions appear
to accept the concept that jobs can be compared on the basis of
their value or worth to the employer to determine whether there is
wage discrimination. To that extent, both Washington State and ANA
go beyond the Gunther model and appear to resolve an issue that
has troubled many courts.1 1 3 On the other hand, both cases never-
theless limit comparable worth claims to disparate treatment theory,
and indicate that strong proof of discriminatory intent will be nec-
essary in order to prevail even on that theory. Thus, the decisions
create a new hoop for plaintiffs to jump through, an extremely
narrow one.
The limited framework for comparable worth litigation which these
two cases have erected has already begun to shape strategy in wage
discrimination cases. At the time these two decisions were issued,
a sizable number of comparable worth cases were pending in various
pre-trial stages.1 4 The opinions generated a flood of motions to
dismiss the cases, on the basis that they simply raised disparate impact
claims, a legal theory which had now been rejected for comparable
women from applying for particular jobs or to steer them toward particular jobs, would
be justifiably surprised to discover that it may be violating federal law because each
wage rate and therefore the ratio between them has been found to be determined by
cultural or psychological factors attributable to the history of male domination of
society; that it has to hire a consultant to find out how it must, regardless of market
conditions, change the wages it pays, in order to achieve equity between traditionally
male and traditionally female jobs; and that it must pay backpay, to boot.
Id. at 720; see also Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1108,
1116 (7th Cir. 1986) ("conceivably sexual harassment may differ sufficiently from other forms
of employee misconduct to justify fewer preventive efforts by the employer. It is difficult to
police . . . and probably can never be completely extirpated from the workplace. A reasonable
effort to limit it is all that Title VII requires"). As one commentary has noted:
By and large the performance of American judges in the area of sex discrimination
can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to abominable. With some notable
exceptions, they have failed to bring to sex discrimination cases those judicial virtues
of detachment, reflection and critical analysis which have served them so well with
respect to other sensitive social issues. Particularly striking .... , is the contrast between
judicial attitudes toward sex and race discrimination. Judges have largely freed themselves
from patterns of thought that can be stigmatized as racist .... With respect to sex
discrimination, however, the story is different. "Sexism" . . . is as easily discernible
in contemporary judicial opinions as racism ever was. (emphasis in original).
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 675, 676 (1971).
113. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 59.
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worth claims.- 5 Virtually none of those motions were successful, but
only because it was clear from the complaint, or was argued by
plaintiffs when those motions were heard, that the cases also alleged
Gunther-type claims of intentional, disparate treatment-type discrim-
ination. 116 Thus, the cases survived dismissal only at the cost of the
most powerful legal theory for the plaintiffs.
The very weakness and unpersuasiveness of the Washington State
and ANA disparate impact analyses provides some hope that the
framework of comparable worth claims may yet expand to the full
range of Title VII discrimination theory. Equally important as this
theoretical issue to the development of comparable worth as a legal
doctrine is the resolution of evidentiary issues necessary for the proof
of such claims and the implementation of appropriate remedies. The
availability of disparate impact theory will be meaningless if the
courts continue to conclude that comparable worth claims are in-
capable of proof or that courts are unable to assess the kinds of
evidence offered to prove such claims. In particular, the use and
analysis of job evaluation studies and market wage rates is critical.
The Supreme Court's most recent wage discrimination decision,
Bazemore v. Friday,"7 indicates that courts can and must evaulate
precisely this kind of evidence in wage discrimination cases. The
decision also suggests a broad view of the scope of wage discrimination
115. See, e.g., Foster v. Arcata Ass'n, Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1465-66 (9th Cir. 1985) (opinion
amended October 25, 1985) (plaintiffs must come within Gunther framework in order to
prevail in Title VII wage discrimination case, citing the Washington State opinion); California
State Employees Ass'n v. California, No. C-84-7275-MHP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 1985) (LExIs,
Genfed Library, Dist. File) (court denied motion to dismiss on basis that plaintiffs alleged
they intended to prove intentional discrimination); St. Louis Newspaper Guild v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 618 F. Supp. 1468, 1469 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (motion to dismiss denied on basis
plaintiffs alleged Gunther-type claim of intentional discrimination; case settled February 25,
1986).
One other interesting development that appears to be in reaction to the Washington State/
ANA opinions is an effort to pursue comparable worth claims under state discrimination laws.
On June 13, 1986, three locals of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) filed
a complaint in California under state law alleging -intentional wage discrimination on the basis
of sex, race, and national origin, in addition to promotion claims. SEIU v. County of Los
Angeles, Los Angeles Superior Court, No. 000985 (June 13, 1986) (LExIs, State Library,
California File). The suit was brought on behalf of approximately 30,000 of the county's
60,000 full time employees and alleges job segregation, denial of equal opportunity to transfer
or promotion to higher paid positions, and undercompensation. Id. The suit was filed after
the county failed to respond to a 1984 SEIU report which allegedly showed severe occupational
concentration by sex and race, and underpayment of women and minorities by $6,000 to
$7,000 annually in comparison to similarly situated white males. Id.
116. Supra note 115 and accompanying text.
117. 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
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claims under Title VII. Bazemore thereby serves as a strong coun-
terweight to the limited framework of wage discrimination claims
set forth in the Washington State/ANA cases.
C. Bazemore
In Bazemore v. Friday, the Supreme Court considered whether the
failure to correct historic race-based pay inequities after the effective
date of Title VII constitutes actionable discrimination as a present
violation of the statute." 8 Prior to 1965, the North Carolina Ag-
ricultural Extension Service was divided into a "white branch" and
a "Negro branch," and paid lower salaries to its agents in the Negro
branch." 9 In 1965, the branches were merged in response to the
enactment of Title VII, but the salary disparities were never totally
eliminated. 120
The Court held that regardless of when the pattern of discrimination
began, wage discrimination occurs each time a black employee is
issued a paycheck which contains less than that paid to a similarly
situated white employee.' 21 The Court viewed the resolution of this
issue as a simple matter, "too obvious to warrant extended dis-
cussion.' 122 Conduct or practices that would have been a violation
of the statute, but for the fact that the statute was not yet effective
became violations once the statute became effective, and continue
to be violations if the employer continues to engage in them. 123 The
Court indicated in a footnote that this case is clearly distinguishable
from prior Title VII cases where it had held that the perpetuation
of the effects of pre-Act or time-barred discrimination does not
constitute actionable discrimination: the critical difference, the Court
noted, is that in Bazemore the salary structure itself illegally dis-
criminates because "it is a mere continuation of the pre-[Act] dis-
criminatory pay structure.' ' 24 The present salary structure could,
therefore, potentially discriminate against two groups of employees:
those hired prior to the merger of the two branches, and those hired
after the merger. 25 For those hired when the branches were segregated,
118. Id. at 3002.
119. Id. at 3004.
120. Id. It is interesting that the case hints at sex-based wage discrimination as well in the
county's compensation system and failure to rectify that pay disparity. Id. at 3010 n.12.
121. Id. at 3006.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 3007 n.6; see also id. at 3007 n.8.
125. Id. at 3007 n.8.
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the failure to eliminate the historic pay disparity in the compensation
structure would constitute discrimination; for those hired after the
branches were integrated, any continued incorporation of pay dis-
parities would constitute discrimination. 26
The Court devoted the bulk of its opinion to the evidentiary issues
raised by the case. The district court had refused to admit the plain-
tiffs' multiple regression analysis as proof of discrimination.127 To
test the hypothesis that the salary structure discriminated on the basis
of race the regression analysis had used four variables: race, edu-
cation, tenure, and job title. Those factors were chosen as the result
of discovery testimony that four factors were the basis for salary
determination: education, tenure, job title, and job performance. 12
The trial court rejected this evidence on the basis that the analysis
had not included sufficient factors. 129 That concern, the Court stated,
is not a basis to deny admission of the evidence, but rather goes
to the weight of the evidence.' 3° More importantly, however, the
Court emphasized that the trial court was imposing an overly difficult
(perhaps impossible) burden of proof on the plaintiffs. 13' The plaintiffs
need not, the Court stated, prove discrimination with scientific cer-
tainty; rather, the plaintiffs' burden is only to establish discrimination
by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 2 That burden has been satisfied
if the trial court "may fairly conclude, in light of all the evidence,
that it is more likely than not that impermissible discrimination
exists."1 3
The Court clearly indicated that the lower courts had erred in not
properly evaluating the evidence of discrimination in this case. 34 The
Court suggested that the plaintiffs' multiple regression analysis was
persuasive evidence, perhaps even sufficient evidence to establish
discrimination.'35 In addition to this analysis, however, the plaintiffs
presented what the Court termed an "impressive array" of additional
126. Id.
127. Id. at 3009.
128. Id. at 3008.
129. Id. at 3009.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.. The Court clearly implied that it felt that the plaintiffs were entitled to prevail
in light of the evidence presented in addition to the multiple regression analysis. Id. at 3009-
10.
134. Id. at 3009.
135. Id.
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evidence to support their claim of wage discrimination. 3 6 Included
in that array was the defendant's own regression analysis of its
compensation system, which indicated results similar to those in the
plaintiffs' analysis, and evidence concerning the defendant's knowl-
edge of the wage disparity and its failure to correct the disparity.1 3
7
Although Bazemore is a race-based wage discrimination case, it
has enormous theoretical and evidentiary significance for sex-based
wage discrimination claims and the concept of comparable worth.'
Theoretically, the decision signals the rejection of arguments that
the "mere" perpetuation of historic intentional wage discrimination
is not a current violation of Title VII. Historic patterns of sex-based
wage discrimination, therefore, would similarly be actionable if per-
petuated in compensation systems. There is no reason to limit this
prohibition to the facts of Bazemore, which in a sex discrimination
context would constitute a claim for failure to pay equal salaries
for equal work regardless of sex. Rather, it should also apply to
the failure of the employer to reevaluate its compensation structure
to eliminate sex or sex stereotypes from the determination of com-
pensation for jobs predominantly held by women and to pay salaries
proportionate to the relative value of work regardless of sex.
The Court's treatment of historic wage discrimination does not,
of course, resolve the most important theoretical issue concerning
comparable worth, whether disparate impact theory can be used to
prove and analyze a comparable worth claim. Nevertheless, the Court's
recognition of historic practices as a source of continuing wage dis-
crimination may suggest that the Court would not necessarily limit
wage discrimination claims to a single model, such as the fortuitous
factual setting of the Gunther case.13 9 Alternatively, it may suggest
that the Court is more sensitive to the inequity of the continuation
of clearly discriminatory (particularly intentionally discriminatory)
practices. Hopefully, it does not indicate that the Court would analyze
sex-based wage discrimination claims any differently than race-based
wage discrimination claims. 140
136. Id.
137. Id. at 3009-10.
138. At least one court has agreed, remanding a sex-based wage discrimination claim in
light of Bazemore. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1003, 1004 (2d
Cir. 1986).
139. Cf. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974) (Equal Pay Act is
broadly remedial and should be applied to fulfill underlying purpose which Congress sought
to achieve).
140. But see Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 39, 44-47 (discussing Supreme
[Vol. XX:833
COMPARABLE WORTH
The Court's treatment of the evidentiary issues in Bazemore has
more unambiguous significance for the concept of comparable worth.
The opinion clearly indicates that wage discrimination claims are
capable of proof and of evaluation by the courts. The opinion,
therefore, implicitly rejects two of the common concerns of the courts
in comparable worth cases: that such claims cannot be proved to
a sufficient level of certainty, or that the courts are not equipped
to evaluate such claims. As Bazemore reaffirms, the burden of proof
in a discrimination claim is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
but rather is proof by a preponderance of the evidence that it is
more likely than not that discrimination exists. The proper evaluation
of such claims does not require that proof of discrimination be
absolute, or that all other possible explanations be eliminated. Rather,
there must be sufficient evidence from which the conclusion of dis-
crimination can be inferred which stands unrebutted by evidence
supporting an alternative explanation or an affirmative defense.
The opinion also indicates what types of evidence would be suf-
ficient to support a finding of wage discrimination. Multiple regression
analysis, or some statistical means by which the variety of factors
which determine compensation can be analyzed, is critical in such
cases. 41 It appears to be at least sufficient if the factors included
in the regression are based upon discovery information regarding the
employer's articulated component factors for determining compen-
sation. 142 Conversely, if a prima facie case of discrimination is estab-
lished, it will not be rebutted simply by claiming that "many factors
go into making up an individual employee's salary."'' 43 The employer
must order those factors and demonstrate that indeed these non-
discriminatory factors account for differences in compensation.'"
Furthermore, an employer's study of its compensation system which
indicates the existence of illegal wage disparities is considered strong
evidence of discrimination. The inference of discrimination that the
Court draws from such evidence directly contradicts the treatment
Court's differential treatment of race and sex). See generally Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism,
and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 584-93
(1977).
141. This does not address the issue of whether multiple regression analysis is transferable
to comparable worth claims. See generally Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases:
Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet,
36 STAN. L. Rav. 1299 (1984).
142. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. at 3009.
143. Id. at 3010-11 n.14.
144. Id.
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of such studies in the Washington State/ANA decisions, which view
them as evidence of a good faith effort to identify discrimination
which should not have the consequence of creating legal liability. 41
Furthermore, according to Bazemore, knowledge of the conclusions
of a study indicating discriminatory disparities in the compensation
system, or actions taken to reduce, but not to eliminate, discriminatory
disparities also constitute evidence of discrimination.l4 In other words,
once there is knowledge of discrimination, there is an obligation to
correct it. Again, the inference from such evidence is exactly opposite
to the Washington State/ANA framework, which rejects the position
that such evidence indicates the intent to discriminate because of
sex, and views it only as awareness of discriminatory consequences
in spite of inaction by the employer.147
Bazemore, then, suggests a wholly different approach to wage
discrimination claims from the narrow framework of the Washington
State/ANA opinions. Factually, it presents another category of dis-
crimination, the perpetuation of historic discriminatory practices as
analyzed under pattern and practice theory, suggesting that the phe-
nomenon of wage discrimination is sufficiently complex that it cannot
be encompassed by a single discrimination theory or general category
of causation. The court's treatment of evidentiary issues implicitly
rejects the institutional arguments concerning the capability of plain-
tiffs to prove and courts to evaluate evidence of wage discrimination,
and suggests the kinds of evidence sufficient to prove wage dis-
crimination claims. The decision, therefore, stands as a significant
counterweight to the limiting trend of the Washington State/ANA
opinions, suggesting that those cases have not determined the shape
of the legal doctrine of comparable worth.
III. THE FUTURE OF COMPARABLE WORTH
Viewed from the conflicting perspectives of the Washington State!
ANA opinions and the Bazemore case, the doctrine of comparable
worth remains in considerable flux. It is well to remember that only
six years have passed since Gunther was decided, and cases are just
beginning to be litigated where comparable worth claims are fully
developed and presented. While the next phase of litigation is, there-
fore, important to doctrinal development, the significance of the
145. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
146. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. at 3009.
147. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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current framework must be carefully assessed. To conclude that com-
parable worth is dead as a legal theory because of the Washington
State and ANA opinions overstates their persuasiveness and long
term impact, particularly in light of the indications from Bazemore
that the Supreme Court may be open to a broader concept of wage
discrimination.
Whether a broader concept ultimately prevails in large part depends
upon whether disparate impact theory can be used as a basis for
comparable worth claims. Without the benefit of this theory, it is
doubtful that comparable worth will be an effective tool to achieve
meaningful equality or closure of the wage gap. The immediate
difficulty is whether the disparate impact issue will be presented or
preserved in cases currently being litigated. 4 The Washington State
and ANA opinions have provided overburdened trial courts with the
means to limit the scope of comparable worth cases, with the result
that in the short run, litigants will try to fit within the Gunther
disparate treatment paradigm dictated by the Washington State and
ANA cases. The disparate impact issue may not be resolved, therefore,
because it simply will not be raised.149
If the issue is raised, the plethora of cases involving complex and
sophisticated employment practices analyzed under disparate impact
theory should be sufficient to rebut the view that the theory is subject
to a complexity limitation. 50 In addition, the broad remedial goal
of Title VII'5' supports an expansive application of disparate impact
theory, particularly in light of the persistence of discriminatory prac-
tices. 5 2 On the other hand, the attempt to limit disparate impact
theory to "simple" cases of discrimination may indicate a need to
148. It is likely that the analysis of this issue will not come from the Washington State
or ANA cases, as Washington State has settled, see supra note 63, and the ANA decision
has not been appealed.
149. One alternative to this may be to present evidence to support such a claim and preserve
the theoretical issue for appeal.
150. See supra note 84.
151. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification"); see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986) ("the
language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase
'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment ... ").
152. See generally U.S. CWI RIoHrs COMEassIoN, STATUS OF Cwnr RIGHTS 1957-1983; Cal-
more, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR.
L. REv. 201, 208-09 (1982).
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rethink our legal definition of discrimination rather than be confined
to defending accepted analysis. What may be needed, in other words,
is to articulate a new theory or analysis of discrimination. Certainly
there is nothing in Title VII jurisprudence to indicate that the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories are intended to demarcate
the limit of legal analysis of discrimination. The limitation of theory
is a matter of accepted practice, not of doctrine.'53
To the extent disparate treatment theory remains the framework
of analysis of comparable worth claims, the theory and proof of
discriminatory intent will be the key to the outcome of current cases.
If the courts continue to require proof of specific intent as suggested
by Washington State/ANA, even disparate treatment theory will be
largely useless as a means to establish comparable worth claims.
Plaintiffs may be forced, therefore, to challenge this interpretation
of the intent requirement of Title VII disparate treatment analysis.
Of equal or greater importance will be the effective presentation
of evidence to support a broad comparable worth claim. The most
difficult obstacle to surmount in order to establish liability under
a broad concept of comparable worth is the problem of proof. The
courts have grudgingly accepted the idea that theoretically one can
establish the worth or value of a job. Since Bazemore, the argument
can be made that the assessment of job evaluation evidence is a task
which the courts must perform. The thoroughness and sophistication
of the courts' analysis of such evidence will depend upon the degree
of assistance that plaintiffs provide to the courts by the presentation
of useful expert testimony.
Plaintiffs will also have to confront the equally significant evi-
dentiary problem of the analysis of market wage rates. Currently,
the practice of using market wage rates is treated as a per se defense
for employers. Courts are convinced the market is objective and
nondiscriminatory, or that if it is not, employers cannot be held
accountable for its deficiencies. Comparable worth claimants must
present evidence of discrimination in the market to eliminate the
concern that individual employers are being made sacrificial lambs
and replace it with the view that it is not a defense to discrimination
that everyone else is doing it.
The courts' acceptance of certain aspects of the concept of com-
parable worth indicates that judges may be more receptive to litigation
153. Such a reexamination must confront the perception that comparable worth claims
arbitrarily require "innocent" employers to shoulder liability for societal discrimination. See
generally Brodin, supra note 80, at 993.
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of component parts of the concept. It may be more fruitful, therefore,
to break down the claim of wage discrimination into specific practices
which affect the compensation structure. Courts seem to be partic-
ularly concerned about allegations of occupational segregation. 54 Proof
of the explicit or more subtle means by which occupational segregation
has been accomplished, and continues to occur, is critical to estab-
lishing both the existence of such practices and their effect on com-
pensation. The courts similarly may be more comfortable determining
whether certain job evaluation schemes discriminate than attempting
to evaluate and compare the worth of particular jobs.
Perhaps the most important factor in the development of com-
parable worth doctrine will be the continued existence of the con-
ditions which gave rise to the legal theory. According to most studies,
if current trends persist, occupational concentration and the wage
gap will exist well into the next century, while an increasing proportion
of women will enter the workplace. This combination of factors will
provide the raw material for continued pressure to implement the
concept of comparable worth. The metamorphosis of the legal doc-
trine will determine whether it will become an effective tool to resolve
this unavoidable issue. Without that tool, the underlying issues will
nevertheless remain as a labor relations issue that employers eventually
will be forced to address.
154. Indeed, even Judge Posner, the author of. the ANA opinion, evidences concern for
job "steering" and embraces the use of both disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses
to examine such practices in an opinion issued shortly before this article went to press. EEOC
v. Madison Community Unit School Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 588 (7th Cir. 1987).

